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INTERPRETIVE SCHIZOPHRENIA: HOW
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING CAN SOLVE THE
ENFORCE-BUT-NOT-DEFEND PROBLEM
Abner S. Greene*
INTRODUCTION
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.1

On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder informed House Speaker
Boehner by letter that President Obama had determined that section 3 is
unconstitutional as applied to “same-sex couples who are legally married
under state law.”2 Heightened scrutiny should apply, wrote Holder, and
accordingly the Department of Justice (DOJ) would not defend section 3 in
circuit courts where the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny was
still open.3 The DOJ would defend the statute, however, were a circuit to
determine that only the rational basis test need apply.4 Holder also wrote:
Notwithstanding this determination, the President has informed me that
Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the Executive Branch. To that
end, the President has instructed Executive agencies to continue to
comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive’s
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and
until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive
verdict against the law’s constitutionality. This course of action respects

* Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Pamela Terry for
expert research assistance. Thanks also to David Barron, Joe Landau, Ethan Leib, Dan
Meltzer, and Aaron Saiger for written comments and tough questions.
1. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
2. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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the actions of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes
the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.5

This means that if, say, two women are legally married under New York
law and seek a federal benefit owed to a married couple, the benefits
administrator must say No, the couple could then file a lawsuit, and then the
DOJ will refuse to defend. If that were the end of the matter, we’d have a
default judgment, but Congress could intervene as a defendant (more on
this later), so we’d have a proper case between adverse parties (with, as has
happened, the DOJ filing a brief supporting the married couple). This is
interpretive schizophrenia6: the very same President is enforcing a law he
believes to be unconstitutional—and harming people7—and then in the next
breath refusing to defend the law because he believes it to be
unconstitutional. As I’ll say a bit about below, the “Take Care Clause”
argument is a nonstarter.8 The best reason for the “enforce but not defend”
position offered by Holder is the justiciability point: that the buck
shouldn’t stop with the President, as it might if he refused to enforce the
law, but rather should stop with the courts or with Congress were it to
repeal the law.9
There are two possible arguments against this position: one, that it’s fine
for the buck to stop with the President if he believes the law is
unconstitutional;10 two, that were the President not to enforce section 3, it
would be appropriate for Congress to sue the President to seek a judicial
declaration regarding the statute’s constitutionality, even though there
would be no classically injured private party. I’ll write briefly about the
first possibility and then focus on the second. To summarize: On the first:
although the President has broad constitutional interpretive authority, the

5. Id.; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 17, 2012), available at
http://sldn.3cdn.net/b43c938d6601df41b9_26m6bu2hc.pdf.
6. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 570 (2012) (“The Holder letter . . . is a curious blend of presidential
interpretive autonomy and the DOJ’s obligations to the courts . . . .”).
7. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 58 (2000) (setting forth harm from
presidential enforcement of a law he deems unconstitutional, in a different setting).
8. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
9. See Johnsen, supra note 7, at 35, 40, 41, 47–50, 51; see also Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Abner J. Mikva, White House Counsel ¶ 5 (Nov.
2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm. Professor Meltzer also
raises a kind of interpretive chaos concern with “a regime in which each administration
views itself as having significant latitude to refuse to enforce and defend acts of Congress.”
Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1228
(2012). The alternative of the executive presumptively kowtowing to Congress and to the
courts is not particularly attractive, though, and if the President exercises appropriate
interpretive humility (as should all three branches), we might achieve true multi-branch
constitutional dialogue. See infra note 13.
10. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 509; see also Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1224
(describing the argument).
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passive virtues apply to him as well as to the Article III courts,11 and going
it alone makes less structural constitutional sense than involving both
Congress and the courts. On the second: We should be open to
congressional lawsuits in settings such as this, and there’s a net gain from
operating this way as opposed to creating scores of injured private parties
who then have to engage in litigation.12
I. PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATION
There is no interpretive obligation in constitutional law. Or rather, there
shouldn’t be. In other words, when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, one
need not defer to either prior or higher authority, even merely
presumptively. Prior authority: neither the original intent (understanding)
of the framers (or ratifiers) nor the original public meaning of the
Constitution’s text is binding on present-day interpreters. The same goes
for precedent. Higher authority: what the Supreme Court thinks the
Constitution means, at any moment in time, is not binding on other
government officials (except that court judgments are binding). I have
developed these arguments recently13 and will say only a bit about them
here. The President has constitutional interpretive authority coordinate with
that of Congress and the federal courts.
Sometimes called
“departmentalism,” the idea is that the Constitution doesn’t place
interpretive authority in the courts alone; each branch of government must
interpret the Constitution in carrying out its functions.14 One function of
11. See Joseph Landau, The President and the Passive Virtues (Sept. 6, 2012)
(unpublished article) (on file with author).
12. There are several recent examples of federal benefits denied to legally married samesex couples because of DOMA section 3. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp.
2d 394, 397–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL
4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S.
July 15, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012) Gill
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379–84 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom.
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). In a nod
to the difficult position the President is in when denying benefits he believes are
constitutionally due, the DOJ filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari
before the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski, arguing
for this unusually expedited review in part because “[e]xecutive departments and agencies
will continue to deny federal benefits to scores of affected individuals until this Court
reaches a definitive resolution of the question presented.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Before Judgment at 15, Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinski, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012).
13. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY chs. 3–4 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (1999); Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 522, 526–32; Frank
H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 905 (1990); Gary
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1995); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J.
1613, 1616 (2008); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 778–79 (2002).
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the President is executing the laws, and he must interpret the Constitution in
doing that, as well as in performing more unilateral tasks, such as
exercising the pardon, veto, or commander in chief powers.15
As have others, I reject the following arguments for a more deferential
presidential posture: that he should interpret the Constitution as he believes
the Supreme Court would;16 that the presidential oath requires a more
deferential approach;17 that the Take Care Clause does, as well;18 and that
the President’s power to resist legislation as unconstitutional ends with the
veto power.19 The first argument is directly contradictory to the tenets of
departmentalism.20 The oath argument turns on an understanding of
faithful execution, or of preserving, protecting, and defending the
Constitution, as including deference to Congress (and the Courts), but that
position begs the question whether faithful execution et al. require
deference rather than (at least some degree of) interpretive independence.21
The same can be said of the Take Care Clause argument, i.e., whether
taking care that the laws are faithfully executed requires deferring to
Congress’ (or the courts’) view of constitutionality is the question to be
discussed; maybe faithful execution means the President should not enforce

15. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, The President’s Power of Interpretation: Implications of
a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 37–38 (1993)
(generally endorsing departmentalism, but less so regarding nonenforcement of domestic
legislation; there he urges more deference to Congress).
16. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2000); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 9, ¶ 4;
see also David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 113, 113 (1993). David Strauss’s views are halfway between the positions of Walter
Dellinger, see supra note 9, and David Barron, see infra note 20.
17. But see Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 521–22, 523–26; Prakash, supra note 14,
at 1616 (in both pieces, arguing that the oath prevents the President from enforcing laws he
deems unconstitutional).
18. But see Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 522, 532–35; Prakash, supra note 14, at
1616 (in both pieces, arguing that the Take Care Clause prevents the President from
enforcing laws he deems unconstitutional).
19. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 867 (1994).
20. See Prakash, supra note 14, at 1674; see also David Barron, Constitutionalism in the
Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
61, 81, 88 (2000) (arguing that it doesn’t make sense for the President to defer to the Court
when the Court’s interpretive structure is based on complex tiers of deference to the political
branches, and he adds that enforcement to tee up justiciability might matter only if the courts
need to resolve relative interpretive authority of the President versus Congress).
21. See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1195–96.
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laws he believes to be unconstitutional.22 Finally, I join those who believe
the veto power to be one stage, (non)enforcement decisions, another.23
Although the arguments for presidential constitutional interpretive
authority are strong—even in executing domestic legislation—Professor
Prakash goes too far when he argues that the Constitution requires the
President to “disregard unconstitutional statutes.”24 The President, no less
(or more) than the other branches, should engage in interpretive humility;25
part of doing his job properly may involve (at least in some instances)
deference to other branches’ views of constitutional meaning. My
arguments against interpretive obligation are not arguments against judicial
review, and inter-branch interpretive dialogue is enhanced when the
President gives the courts an opportunity to weigh in on his
(non)enforcement decisions based on his reading of the Constitution.
Although judicial review may be less important for some PresidentCongress battles, enforcement vel non of domestic legislation usually
implicates private parties in one way or another, and thus we should
consider appropriate mechanisms for judicial involvement.
If the President declines to enforce a law because he deems it
unconstitutional, Congress sues, the case goes to the Supreme Court, and
the Court rules in favor of Congress, I am assuming the Court would issue a
declaratory judgment, telling the President that his constitutional basis for
nonenforcement is incorrect. How one thinks about what the President may
do next depends on what sort of departmentalist one is. The weakest
departmentalism would just grant the President authority to interpret the
Constitution when engaged in unilateral functions such as the veto and the
pardon. The strongest departmentalism would go all the way to permitting
the President to disobey a court judgment in a specific case. My
departmentalism is somewhere between these two; I have argued that the
President may interpret the Constitution when enforcing the law and when
deciding how to account for judicial precedent, but not that he may disobey
court orders.26 For the President to continue nonenforcement in the face of
the Court’s declaring his constitutional interpretation wrong would not
22. See id. at 1192–96. Although I am generally sympathetic with Professor Prakash’s
arguments for departmentalism, his insistence that the presidential oath and the Take Care
Clause require the President to refrain from enforcing laws the President deems
unconstitutional, see supra notes 17–18, is just as problematic as the opposing view, i.e., that
the oath and the Take Care Clause require deference to Congress and the courts. Whether
faithful execution requires deference, independence, or something in between, cannot be
answered by the language of the presidential oath or the Take Care Clause. Structural
arguments, and arguments from applied political-constitutional theory, are needed.
23. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 536–37; Prakash, supra note 14, at 1633–35;
see also Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 9, ¶ 7.
24. Prakash, supra note 14, at 1616. See generally Devins & Prakash, supra note 6.
25. See Barron, supra note 20, at 90, 92; Johnsen, supra note 7, at 17; Dawn E. Johnsen,
What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration
Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 412 (2008); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note
9, ¶¶ 3–4.
26. See GREENE, supra note 13, at 54, 215, 217, 228–32.
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strictly speaking constitute defying a court order, but neither should we
consider it merely disregard of precedent. The President should not
continue his constitutionally based nonenforcement unless he has very good
reasons to countermand the Court. What factors a President should
consider is something I’ll leave for another day.
II. CONGRESSIONAL STANDING
Had President Obama stuck to his interpretive guns and stopped
enforcing section 3 of DOMA, legally married same-sex couples would
receive federal benefits that legally married opposite-sex couples receive.
There would be no classically injured private party; with an (increasingly
narrow) Establishment Clause exception,27 arguably illegal expenditure of
federal funds does not usually ground standing in citizens or taxpayers. But
in this scenario, the President is treating a properly enacted law as if it were
no law at all. (This isn’t simply a matter of enforcement discretion.) That
action arguably injures the United States of America as a public corporate
entity, and it arguably injures Congress, as the body that passed the law.
(Whether with or without a presidential signature should not matter.) After
all, if, for example, a state court invalidates a federal statute as
unconstitutional, the United States, through the DOJ, may appeal that
ruling, all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.28 There, the DOJ is
representing the United States, as a party injured by the state court ruling.
When such a case reaches the Supreme Court, there have to be properly
adverse parties to ground Article III standing, and the U.S., seeking to unnullify its law, is such a party. If the President in effect nullifies a federal
law by refusing to enforce it on constitutional grounds, things are no
different than if a court declares a federal law unconstitutional. In both
settings, the United States as a governmental body is harmed and should be
allowed to seek judicial review in federal court. Since the President (and
his DOJ) are unavailable to defend the constitutionality of a statute the
President has decided neither to enforce nor to defend, it makes sense to
permit Congress to seek a declaratory judgment as to the statute’s
constitutionality. Congress gets to represent the United States, to defend
the constitutionality of a law it has passed, and to involve the third branch,
the judiciary, in the constitutional determination. There are procedural
complexities I’ll cover in Part IV—who precisely is suing, on behalf of
whom, and with what authorization. Until then, assume that Congress is
suing, on behalf of either the United States or itself, with appropriate
authorization.

27. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968). But see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition
Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S.
587 (2007); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
28. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 517 (“Interest of United States in pending suits.”).
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The leading case about congressional standing is Raines v. Byrd,29 and it
distinguishes another important case, about state legislative standing,
Coleman v. Miller.30 In Raines, a group of U.S. Congresspersons sued in
federal court to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act, claiming that the Act
improperly aggrandized presidential power.31 The Court threw the case
out, on standing grounds.32 Plaintiffs’ claim, said the Court, “is that the Act
causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power),
which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of
Congress equally . . . . [Plaintiffs] do not claim that they have been
deprived of something to which they personally are entitled . . . .”33 There
are three separate ideas embedded in this passage: first, that diminution of
legislative power is insufficient injury for Article III standing; second, that
members of Congress may not sue in federal court in their official capacity;
third, that whatever injury is present is too widely shared, and not specific
enough.
The first ends up being most important, because of how the Court treats
Coleman. There, the Kansas State Senate deadlocked 20–20 on a federal
constitutional amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor cast a tie-breaking
vote in favor (and the State House voted yes).34 Plaintiffs, in state court,
were the 20 state senators who had voted no;35 one of their merits
arguments was that Article V of the U.S. Constitution grants amendmentratifying power to state legislatures, which may not include the state
executive. If they were right on this merits point, the amendment should
have been defeated in Kansas, rather than approved. Coleman permitted the
state senate plaintiffs, who had lost in state court, to perfect an appeal to the
Supreme Court:
Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes against
ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if
they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient
to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.36

29. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
30. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
31. Raines, 521 U.S. at 811. This is a claim with which the Court later agreed, once it
could identify some properly injured parties. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998).
32. Raines, 521 U.S. at 811.
33. Id. at 821 (emphasis omitted).
34. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36.
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id. at 438. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the Court held
that if a state court plaintiff lacks what would be sufficient federal court standing, merely
losing in the state courts cannot supply the injury necessary to bring an appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Id. at 434–35. Judge Bork suggested that after Doremus, Coleman might no
longer be good law. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 63 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987)
(mootness). But this isn’t right; the state legislator plaintiffs in Coleman did allege standing
specific to themselves—that their votes were nullified by the Lieutenant Governor’s
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Raines confirmed Coleman’s validity:
[O]ur holding in Coleman stands . . . for the proposition that legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific
legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into
effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been
completely nullified.37

In other words, “[t]here is a vast difference between the level of vote
nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power that is alleged here.”38 The argument for legislative
standing, thus, is not that the law in question arguably impinges on
legislative power or improperly adds to executive power. Rather, the
argument is that legislators have standing to make sure that laws don’t
become non-laws, and to make sure that non-laws don’t become laws.39
When the President declares that he won’t enforce a federal statute
because he deems it unconstitutional, he has completely nullified the votes
of those in favor of the law, and arguably under Coleman any one or more
of those who voted for the law may sue to set aside the President’s
nonenforcement decision. After canvassing some lower court cases on both
the Raines and Coleman sides of the ledger, I’ll discuss some serious
separation of powers arguments against legislative standing.
One
conclusion is that we might indeed be wary of permitting individual federal
legislators, or groups of such, to claim sufficient injury, but that if we see
presidential nullification of a statute in a different light, we can see that it
injures the United States or Congress, or perhaps either house, as an
institution.
Several post-Raines cases fall on the Raines side of the ledger. In Russell
v. DeJongh,40 a Virgin Islands senator sued to set aside judicial
commissions, claiming that the governor had failed to follow proper
procedure. The Third Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing:
The courts have drawn a distinction . . . between a public official’s
mere disobedience of a law for which a legislator voted—which is not an
improper action. If we accept this claim of legislative injury (as Coleman did and as Raines
reaffirms), there’s no Doremus problem. See id. at 28 n.15 (Coleman plaintiffs had injury
cognizable for federal standing purposes).
Note that the principal opinion in Coleman is for three Justices only; they concluded that
plaintiffs had standing and that the case should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political
question. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450. Four other Justices thought there was no standing,
but agreed with the plurality that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question,
although on somewhat different reasoning. See id. at 457–58 (Black, J., concurring). The
remaining two Justices went straight to a merits issue, concluding that too much time had
elapsed since the constitutional amendment in question had been initially proposed, and thus
that Kansas’ purported ratification came too late. See id. at 471–72 (Butler, J., dissenting).
To reach the merits, these two Justices must have believed standing was present.
37. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823.
38. Id. at 826.
39. For “law” we can substitute “legislative action” to cover the unusual nature of what
was at stake in Coleman.
40. 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007).
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injury in fact—and an official’s “distortion of the process by which a bill
becomes law” by nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a legislator of
an opportunity to vote—which is an injury in fact.41

One aspect of the reasoning was that the legislature could still have voted
down the judges; this will be relevant to the upcoming separation of powers
discussion and to the question whether and to what extent legislative selfhelp opportunities should affect legislative standing analysis.
In Chenoweth v. Clinton,42 some House members sued to enjoin
implementation of a program instituted by President Clinton, arguing that it
exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority. The D.C. Circuit held
there was no standing:
If, as the Court held in Raines, a statute that allegedly “divests
[congressmen] of their constitutional role” in the legislative process does
not give them standing to sue, . . . then neither does an Executive Order
that allegedly deprives congressmen of their “right[] to participate and
vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution.”43

Purported executive aggrandizement is insufficient for legislative standing
and there was no claim that President Clinton had either nullified a valid
law or treated as valid law something that was not so.
In Campbell v. Clinton,44 “[a] number of congressmen, led by Tom
Campbell of California, filed suit claiming that the President violated the
War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution by
directing U.S. forces’ participation in the recent NATO campaign in
Yugoslavia.”45 Again, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for lack of
standing.46 Although the court focused on whether the legislators had selfhelp available against the President (they did, said the court), it also more
simply concluded that this was a Raines and not a Coleman case because
President Clinton didn’t arguably nullify valid law, or the opposite.
Finally, in Daughtrey v. Carter,47 a pre-Raines case, two
Congresspersons sued, arguing that President Carter’s pardoning of
Vietnam War draft evaders violated immigration and other laws.48 On
various grounds, the D.C. Circuit held there was no standing.49 The main
point was that the Congresspersons shared an interest that all citizens have
in presidential enforcement of the law, and thus stated a generalized
grievance, insufficient for standing. We may distinguish Daughtrey from
the present hypothetical case—a potential lawsuit against President Obama
for failure to enforce DOMA section 3—in several ways: Daughtrey
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 135.
181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000).
Id. at 115 (alterations in original).
203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 24.
584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1058.
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involved the pardon power, arguably plenary in the President and
nonreviewable (making it a nonjusticiable political question case); I’m
trying to develop an argument for Congress’ suing, not for individual
members’ suing; and Daughtrey did not involve nonenforcement on the
ground that the President deemed a particular law unconstitutional.
Two post-Raines cases, and one decided before Raines, are properly
sorted with Coleman. All three were “pocket veto” cases, i.e., each raised
the merits question whether executive inaction resulted in a bill becoming a
law. Here’s Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution on the subject:
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a
Law.50

In Kennedy v. Sampson,51 Congress passed a bill and sent it to President
Nixon.52 Congress adjourned eight days after the bill was passed, but the
Senate authorized an agent to receive presidential messages during the
adjournment.53 On the tenth day after the bill was passed, the President
indicated he would not sign the bill, but did not formally veto it54 (i.e., did
not “return” the bill to Congress). Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who had
voted for the bill, sued two federal officials, seeking a judicial declaration
that the bill had become a law and an order that it be published as such.
The D.C. Circuit held that Kennedy had standing:
In the present case, appellee has alleged that conduct by officials of the
executive branch amounted to an illegal nullification not only of
Congress’ exercise of its power, but also of appellee’s exercise of his
power. In the language of the Coleman opinion, appellee’s object in this
lawsuit is to vindicate the effectiveness of his vote. No more essential
interest could be asserted by a legislator. We are satisfied, therefore, that
the purposes of the standing doctrine are fully served in this litigation.55

This makes sense; if plaintiff is correct on the merits,56 then the officials’
refusal to treat the bill as law nullified an otherwise valid law, and,
following Coleman, as a member of the body that had voted for the law,
plaintiff had standing to protect the validity of his vote.57 (Recall that in
Coleman plaintiffs alleged the obverse—that their votes, collectively,
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
51. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 432.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 436.
56. On the merits, the court held that because Congress had made arrangements to
receive a presidential veto during its adjournment, the President had not pocket vetoed the
bill, and thus it became law. See id. at 436–42.
57. Post-Raines, Chenoweth confirmed this understanding of Kennedy as still good law.
See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1012 (2000).
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resulted in no-law but that defendants were treating the matter otherwise.)
Again, whether an individual legislator (or legislators) is the proper plaintiff
in such a case, as opposed to the body itself, is a difficult question that I
shall address below.
In Barnes v. Kline,58 plaintiffs were the Senate, the Speaker of the House,
the bipartisan leadership of the House, and members of the House. The
merits issue was similar to that in Kennedy—whether congressional
adjournment prevented return of a bill from the President, thus rendering
his inaction a pocket veto, or whether congressional authorization of agents
to receive a presidential veto meant that the bill became law when the
President failed to act.59 The intervening Raines case notwithstanding, the
court followed Kennedy and held that legislative standing was appropriate.
After all, in upholding standing for an individual legislator, the Kennedy
court had indicated:
[T]hat either house of Congress clearly would have had standing to
challenge the injury to its participation in the lawmaking process, since it
is the Senate and the House of Representatives that pass legislation under
Article I, and [alleged] improper exercise of the pocket veto power
infringes that right more directly than it does the right of individual
members to vote on proposed legislation.60

Finally, in Gutierrez v. Pangelinan,61 the Governor of Guam neither
signed nor vetoed a bill, but rather returned it to the legislature with a
memorandum stating his understanding that the bill would become law
without his signature. Two legislators who had voted against the bill sued
in Guam court for a declaration that the bill had not become a law, but
rather that the Governor had pocket vetoed the law.62 The lower court ruled
for the Governor, but the Guam high court reversed, holding that the
Governor had pocket vetoed the bill.63 As authorized by federal law, the
Governor appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that he had appellate
standing:
For purposes of standing, Governor Gutierrez’s position in this
litigation is analogous to that of the senators in Coleman. He argues that
§ 1423i granted the Governor the power to allow Bill 495 to pass into law
by neither signing nor vetoing it. The Guam Supreme Court’s ruling,
however, had the opposite effect: the Governor’s inaction, in light of the
legislature’s failure to adopt appropriate procedures for receipt of the bill

58. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes,
479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness).
59. The court resolved the merits issue as it had in Kennedy, holding that by authorizing
agents to accept a presidential veto, Congress had (essentially) eliminated the possibility of a
pocket veto during an adjournment. See id. at 30–41. The court refused to distinguish
between the intrasession adjournment in Kennedy and the intersession adjournment here. Id.
at 40.
60. Id. at 26.
61. 276 F.3d 539 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
62. Id. at 543.
63. Id. at 543–44.
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from the Governor, resulted in a pocket veto of Bill 495. Under Coleman
and Raines, the nullification of Governor Gutierrez’s asserted prerogative
establishes his standing.64

The Ninth Circuit also said, as an aside, “[i]t is doubtful that Plaintiffs
would have had standing to seek relief in federal court at the outset of this
case.”65 This seems wrong. Under Coleman, and consistent with Kennedy
and Barnes, the legislators would have had standing to seek a declaration
that what the Governor deemed to be a law was in fact no-law.66
Thus, from the case law there’s a fairly straightforward argument to treat
a presidential decision not to enforce a statute, because he deems the statute
unconstitutional, as a Coleman-type case. The injury to the legislature (or
legislators; I’m finessing that distinction for the moment) isn’t just that the
President has arguably aggrandized his power or diluted legislative power.
Rather, it’s a more fundamental concern with legal validity—the President
has arguably treated valid law as if it were invalid law. There’s one
possible stumbling point here. Raines approves legislative standing from
Coleman if an arguably valid law “does not go into effect.”67 In the type of
case I’m discussing, the law formally goes into effect—and then it becomes
ineffectual because of presidential nonenforcement on constitutional
grounds. How does Clinton v. City of New York68 affect this analysis?
There, the Court held unconstitutional the Line Item Veto Act (LIVA),
which gave the President the power to cancel spending items in laws that
had been enacted through proper Article I, Section 7 process.69 Such
cancellation prevented the item “‘from having legal force or effect.’”70 The
Court’s reasoning was not elaborate: To make a law, or to repeal a law, a
bill must go through bicameralism and presentment (and then possible veto
override). For Congress to give the President power to cancel a spending
item and thereby prevent it from having legal force or effect is to skirt the
constitutionally mandated process for repealing legislation.
In
distinguishing presidential enforcement discretion and discretionary
spending power, the Court held that the LIVA was special because it alone

64. Id. at 546. On the merits, the court agreed with plaintiffs that the bill had not
properly become law. See id. at 547–49.
65. Id. at 544.
66. If I were relying on Coleman to develop a case for the standing of individual
legislators, then the pocket veto cases might not strictly speaking fit, because in none of
those cases was the entire bloc of legislators who voted for a bill suing, nor would such be a
perfect analogy, because Coleman involved a necessary bloc of half the legislators for the
unusual tie type case to arise. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Coleman. But I am relying on Coleman more generally for its concern with the action of
an elected official—there, the Lieutenant Governor’s “no” vote—that nullifies a purportedly
legitimate legislative act. And I am developing an argument for institutional standing, not
for the standing of individual legislators.
67. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).
68. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
69. Id. at 421.
70. Id. at 437 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B)–(C) (2006)).
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“gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted
statutes.”71
The scenario with which I’m concerned does not involve a statute giving
the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes,
nor does it involve his grabbing such power. Thus, perhaps one could argue
that presidential refusal to enforce a law—because he deems it
unconstitutional—is unproblematic in the way that the Clinton dicta
suggests executive enforcement and spending decisions may be
unproblematic. I resist this claim, though, for two reasons (apart from the
fact that I’m discussing Clinton dicta and that Clinton did not consider a
case such as the one I’m discussing). First, although we might normally
think that presidential enforcement and spending decisions are noninjurious
(in and of themselves, as opposed to specific persons who might be
injured), a decision not to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds is
different. It is tantamount to nullifying the statute. It renders law non-law.
Arguably this injures the body politic generally and Congress specifically.
Second, the discussion in Clinton is about the constitutionality of Congress’
giving the President a certain type of power (and we could extend the
reasoning to a situation in which the President himself sought to grab such
power). The issue I’m treating is the threshold one of standing, of what
counts as sufficient injury for a federal court to reach the merits. Even if
presidential nonenforcement on constitutional grounds doesn’t amount to
changing the text of duly enacted statutes (i.e., rendering them formally
without legal effect), it arguably counts as nullifying legislative votes in the
Coleman way, sufficient for standing.
III. SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL STANDING,
AND RESPONSES
In two D.C. Circuit cases,72 Judge Bork and then-Judge Scalia argued
against congressional standing. Their arguments, plus those of some
scholars, offer various reasons grounded in separation of powers to resist
permitting members of Congress (and perhaps Congress as an institution) to
sue in federal court to challenge presidential action or inaction. I first
summarize these arguments, and then attempt to rebut them.
First, as Judge Bork maintained, “except where a conventional lawsuit
requires a judicial resolution, much of the allocation of powers is best left to
political struggle and compromise . . . . Moreover, I know of no grave
consequences for our constitutional system that have flowed from political
struggles between Congress and the President.”73 Similarly, then-Judge
Scalia wrote: “we sit here neither to supervise the internal workings of the
executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those
71. Id. at 447.
72. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (Barnes); infra note 74 and
accompanying text (Moore).
73. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness).
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branches regarding their respective powers.”74 D.C. Circuit Judge
McGowan, although open in principle to congressional standing,
nonetheless invoked a cognate idea when he suggested the court could
dismiss cases on a theory of equitable (or remedial) discretion, focusing on
whether Congress has self-help mechanisms to battle the President.75
Second, perhaps the President’s power to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed, and perhaps part of his executive power more broadly,
involve making determinations regarding the constitutionality of legislation,
at various stages, including both the veto and enforcement. On this view, in
the kind of situation I am discussing, permitting anyone but a classically
injured private party to sue improperly gives Congress or Congresspersons,
with the assistance of the courts, the power to execute and enforce the
law.76 This is similar to one of the arguments Justice Scalia offered in
rejecting citizen suits in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.77 Another aspect of
this second point is that if Congress sues to enforce the law, it is taking on
an executive function, perhaps unconstitutionally, as per cases such as
Bowsher v. Synar.78
Third, perhaps the simplest separation of powers argument against
legislative standing, at least when we’re considering various forms of
claims against the executive, is that legislators are suing in their official
capacity as representatives of citizens, for an injury that is shared by all
those represented.79 Following a line of Supreme Court holdings,80 this sort
of case should accordingly be dismissed as a generalized grievance,
insufficient to support standing. In other words, perhaps such lawsuits lack
the concrete adversariness that is the hallmark of the Court’s Article III case
or controversy jurisprudence.
I will respond to the first two points together. First, I am arguing for
congressional standing only in cases that may reasonably be seen as on the
Coleman side of the Coleman-Raines divide. Specifically, I am making a
case only for congressional standing to seek a judicial declaration in
74. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the result), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 832–35 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Anthony Clark Arend &
Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of
Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 277–81 (2001); Barron, supra note
20, at 99–100.
75. See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV.
241, 244 (1981).
76. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1567–69 (2012).
77. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
78. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
79. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 48–51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting),
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness); cf.
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (“The legislative power
thus committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has
no personal right to it.”).
80. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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response to a stated presidential decision not to enforce a statute he deems
unconstitutional. I am not arguing for congressional standing in the bevy of
other types of disputes that might arise between Congress and the President.
Thus, I can accept arguendo whatever weight there is to the Bork-Scalia
argument in favor of letting the political branches duke it out, except in
Coleman-type cases.
Second, as Carlin Meyer argues, forcing Congress to combat presidential
constitutional nonenforcement outside the courts is costly, and arguably
shifts the burden of action in a constitutionally inappropriate direction.81
After all, in the kind of case with which we’re concerned, Congress has
already surmounted the difficult bicameralism and presentment process,
only to find a President asserting an ex-post executive check on properly
enacted legislation. Congress could begin impeachment proceedings, or try
to tie the President’s hands in other ways, but these are costly and complex
and, more to the point, not directly responsive to the matter at hand. Why
not get all three branches into the mix?
Third, although generally speaking the legislature legislates, the
executive executes, and the judiciary judges, the federal government’s
system of divided powers is more complex than that. The legislature also
impeaches and convicts, and confirms or rejects nominees; the executive
also signs or vetoes legislation; the judiciary also often departs from a
purely case-deciding function, interpreting law in many strictly unnecessary
ways, such as when it issues dicta, alternative holdings, or, as the Court
recently announced permissible, hears appeals from prevailing parties
because of the possible precedential effect of lower court rulings.82 Further,
all three branches, including the executive, properly interpret the
Constitution in the kind of situation with which we’re concerned. Allowing
Congress to step in as enforcer of the law—in a limited way, by asking for a
judicial declaration of constitutionality—makes sense in a system of
divided but also hybrid powers, which permits the President effectively to
nullify a law by deeming it unconstitutional. If we’re going to follow
departmentalism to the end of presidential constitutional nonenforcement—
as I’ve suggested we should, to save private parties from harm and to save
the President from interpretive schizophrenia—then we should see law
enforcement as, occasionally, multi-branch in nature as well.
Bowsher is not to the contrary. Congress had enacted a complex scheme
to balance the budget, delegating significant policymaking power to the
Comptroller General, who was removable by joint resolution of Congress
only (i.e., through bicameralism and presentment).83 The majority viewed
the Comptroller General’s delegated power as executive, and found it
unconstitutional for Congress to have removal power, even with
81. See Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve As
Counterweight?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 84–93 (1992); see also Amanda Frost, Congress in
Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 960–62 (2012).
82. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
83. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717–19, 727–28 (1986).
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presentment, in such a situation: “Congress in effect has retained control
over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function.
The Constitution does not permit such intrusion.”84 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens concluded that the Comptroller General was an
agent of Congress (not only because of its removal power), that he
exercised policymaking power, and that:
Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate national
policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative
committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress such as the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, or
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. That principle, I
believe, is applicable to the Comptroller General.85

On Justice Stevens’ logic, there would be no Bowsher problem were
Congress to sue the President in cases of presidential constitutional
nonenforcement, because Congress isn’t making policy in so doing, nor is a
subset of Congress doing so were the House or Senate alone to sue. On the
majority’s logic, things are a bit closer, because Congress’ suing the
President may be deemed taking over an executive function; generally it is
the President through the DOJ who litigates to support the constitutionality
of federal law (more on this below). But Congress is not here controlling
the execution of law. And the President, after all, has expressly abdicated
his law enforcement function, so Congress may be seen, in this limited type
of case, as stepping into a power vacuum. It’s just another instance of
mixing and mingling of powers, acceptable to ensure a proper balance of
power and a three-branch solution.86
Fourth, we should reject the Scalia-esque argument that placing
execution of the law outside of the President’s control violates either the
Take Care Clause or the vesting of executive power in “a President of the
United States of America.”87 This was a phony argument in Lujan.88 The
citizen-suit provision there was unconstitutional because it sought to permit
as plaintiffs in federal court anyone with an argument that a federal agency
had violated the law, without a specific claim of harm. This is an Article III
problem, violating our conception of a case or controversy.89 It is not
otherwise inappropriate for Congress to create new statutory rights and
enable a potentially vast array of citizens to seek relief in federal court
when they believe an agency has not properly executed the law and when
they can assert harm specific to themselves. That the Court upheld
84. Id. at 734.
85. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983)).
86. On the virtues of multi-branch solutions, see Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets
Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
88. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
89. See id. at 573–78, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
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independent agencies in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States90 and
Morrison v. Olson91 is further evidence that Congress may alienate
executive power from the President, albeit with limits. If we properly see
Congress as injured in an instance of presidential constitutional
nonenforcement, or properly speaking on behalf of an injured United States,
then it is not similar to a citizen-suit plaintiff; rather, it has taken over law
execution power only after the President has refused to exercise such
power, it is acting in a limited type of case, and it is doing so consistent
with an understanding of nonplenary executive power in the President.
I also reject the claim that a congressional suit against the President for
constitutionally based nonenforcement is no more than a generalized
grievance. I’m not sure, however, whether individual Congresspersons (or
groups of Congresspersons) should have standing to sue here. They do
under Coleman, as I have suggested, under the theory that their votes are
nullified by constitutional, categorical nonenforcement. But Coleman itself
is an unusual case, about whether the legislature itself ratified or failed to
ratify a constitutional amendment.92 There, the legislative body could not
have been an appropriate plaintiff. In the pocket veto cases, and in the kind
of case I’m discussing, we can clearly see the legislature pitted against the
executive, claiming a kind of nullification of valid law, or the obverse. In
such cases, the argument that individual legislators merely act as
representatives of their constituents, and don’t have a separate cognizable
interest in the enforcement of laws, at least not in federal court, is a
powerful one. Rather than attempt to overcome that, I would rather turn to
what seems an easier and more obvious route for standing, namely,
permitting Congress itself to sue. Whether this means Congress as a body
or either house as a body, we could see Congress as itself injured when the
President says, “that thing you passed that we all agree is a law that I’m
supposed to enforce? I’m going to treat it as a nullity.” Alternatively, we
could see Congress as speaking on behalf of the United States, seeking a
judicial determination of the law’s validity, just as the DOJ routinely does
when courts around the country challenge or invalidate federal law.
It’s worth addressing three knotty issues here. First, if Congress is suing
on its own behalf rather than on behalf of the United States, may either
house sue separately, or must they sue together? Second, the Congress that
enacts a law, such as DOMA, will often not be the same Congress that sues
the President who isn’t enforcing the law. Who is injured here? Third,
such nonenforcement may be seen as temporary. After all, the current
President or a future President could reverse course and decide to enforce
the law. Is there really injury from the current moment of nonenforcement?
As to the first issue, the Constitution constitutes each house as a separate
body, gives each some separate responsibilities, and requires each

90. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
91. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
92. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.

594

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

separately to pass a bill to enact it into law (and to override a presidential
veto). Thus, it’s plausible to think of each house as separately injured when
a bill it has played a necessary (though not sufficient) role in passing is
nullified by the President. If the insufficiency of either house’s vote is
troubling in thinking about injury, then we could move to the model of
suing on behalf of the United States or on behalf of the Congress as a
whole.
As to the second issue, if we properly see Congress as injured by the type
of presidential nonenforcement I’m discussing, then we should understand
the institution as injured, not individual legislators. And the institution is a
continuing one. Think of Hart’s elegant depersonalization of a legal system
when he discusses “the continuity of the authority to make law” and the
“persistence of laws long after their maker and those who rendered him
habitual obedience have perished.”93 Thus, Congress (and perhaps either
house) as an institution has an ongoing interest in its laws being treated as
at least presumptively valid and worthy of enforcement by the President.
As to the third issue, although presidential nonenforcement on
constitutional grounds may be altered by a sitting or future President, if one
otherwise accepts the idea of the United States or Congress as injured from
such nonenforcement, then it’s not clear why the only remedial option
should be to wait it out (and perhaps cajole the President, now or later, to
change course). Judicial precedent is also changeable, but if, for example, a
circuit court strikes down a federal law, we permit the United States via the
DOJ to appeal the matter. We don’t say, “maybe you could convince the
circuit in the next case to take another look at the issue.” Although we
might sometimes think of judicial precedent as more impervious to change,
we should think of injury to the United States, or to Congress or either
house, as ongoing when either a court or the President treats a valid law as
if it were invalid on constitutional grounds.
What about concrete adversariness? We don’t have to worry about the
adversariness piece—this is not Joe Blow waking up in the morning,
reading about some agency action he thinks is illegal, and suing. That is,
it’s not a citizen suit. Congress is directly harmed when its laws are treated
as non-laws and has every reason to be a vigorous adversary to defend its
turf.
The concreteness piece is harder.94 When the President enforces DOMA
section 3, injured same-sex couples can sue, and the facts of their cases
provide standard concreteness—specific facts from specific injured persons.
If the President were not to enforce DOMA section 3, then legally married
same-sex couples would get appropriate federal benefits, and were
Congress to sue, it wouldn’t be to take away specific benefits from specific
couples. So we wouldn’t have the standard sort of concreteness the Court
says Article III adjudication requires. But we would have many real-world
93. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 51 (2d ed. 1994).
94. See Hall, supra note 76, at 1570.
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examples of how the President’s nonenforcement policy operates. It would
be easy enough to find records of specific federal benefits going to specific
legally married same-sex couples, and the Congress vs. President litigation
could rely on such examples. Concreteness operates as a proxy for
adversariness, which would be present here. It also operates to ensure
focused rather than abstract adjudication, which would be compromised
here, but because of the examples of legally married same-sex couples’
receiving benefits under a presidential policy of not enforcing DOMA
section 3 on constitutional grounds, it would be only somewhat
compromised. The latter is not all that different from how facts would be
presented in a declaratory judgment action by members of a same-sex
couple deciding whether to get married in a state that permits it, and
wanting to know whether they would or would not receive certain federal
benefits, in a setting in which the answer to that question would affect their
decision to get married.
IV. PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING
Finally, I turn to practical questions about implementing congressional
standing to sue when the President engages in nonenforcement because he
believes a law is unconstitutional.95 Ideally, Congress would sue on behalf
of the United States, stepping into the shoes the executive (via the DOJ)
usually fills. A federal statute seems to set parameters on who may speak
for the United States in this way, however. 28 U.S.C. § 516 is titled
“Conduct of litigation reserved to Department of Justice,” and it provides:
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”96 And although 28
U.S.C. § 530D requires the Attorney General to notify Congress when DOJ
is engaging in constitutionally based nonenforcement,97 neither it nor any
other federal statute authorizes Congress, or either house, to litigate on
behalf of the United States.98 Provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 288 establish the
95. Professor Meltzer argues against the solution I recommend because (a) as plaintiff,
the lawyer might have to develop an evidentiary record, and this is something DOJ is expert
at, not congressional counsel, (b) Congress’ view might not “fully register with the courts” if
DOJ and a private party are taking the opposing view, and (c) Congress would have to
follow various procedures and that will depend on which political party is in charge at any
given time. See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1210–12. Regarding (a), Congress can hire expert
litigation counsel (and has done so). See Frost, supra note 81, at 955–56 (discussing
Congress’ amping up its participation in litigation). Regarding (b), I would hope courts
would decide cases on the merits, and not on who’s arguing them. Regarding (c), I agree
with Meltzer, and thus there will be occasions in which majorities in both houses will agree
with the President and not sue to set aside nonenforcement.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006).
97. Id. § 530D(a)(1).
98. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and among other things authorize the
Counsel to appear in court on behalf of the Senate, as intervenor or amicus
curiae, to defend the Senate’s or Congress’ constitutional prerogatives.99
The statute provides that intervention is permissible only if constitutional
standing is also present.100 Under this law, the Counsel could properly
appear on behalf of the Senate to defend a law the President had elected not
to defend—we should see Congress as injured in such instances, as argued
above.101 But the law neither authorizes the Counsel to appear on behalf of
the United States nor grants it power to sue as a plaintiff, even if only on
behalf of the Senate or Congress.
There’s no parallel statute for House Counsel. 2 U.S.C. § 130f describes
some matters relating to the House General Counsel not relevant here, and
states that the term “General Counsel of the House of Representatives”
means “the head of the Office of General Counsel established and operating
under clause 8 of rule II of the Rules of the House of Representatives.”102
That Rule dictates some procedures for directing the Counsel, but otherwise
just states that the Counsel’s purpose is to “provid[e] legal assistance and
representation to the House.”103 That, too, doesn’t satisfy § 516’s
requirement that litigation in which the United States is “interested”—
which I am reading as coterminous with “on behalf of the United States”—
be “authorized by law” if done outside of the DOJ.
Congress could pass a statute authorizing the Senate or House Counsel,
or counsel representing both houses jointly, to litigate—as plaintiff or
defendant-intervenor—on behalf of the United States when the President
asserts he will not enforce a statute because he believes the statute is
unconstitutional. There are several roughly parallel examples of federal
courts permitting legislators or legislative bodies, or other persons, to
appear on behalf of states.104 If one agrees that Congress, or either house,
99. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 288, 288b(c), 288e(a) (2006).
100. See id. § 288e(a).
101. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2002), is not to the contrary.
There, the Ninth Circuit denied intervention to the Senate to defend the constitutionality of
the federally authorized pledge of allegiance. The DOJ was also defending the law, and the
Ninth Circuit didn’t think the Senate alleged Article III injury, a predicate to intervention
under § 288e (a). My contention in the text is that the Senate (or Congress) is injured when
the President, on constitutional grounds, categorically refuses to enforce a properly enacted
law.
102. 2 U.S.C. § 130f(c)(1).
103. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112TH CONG., R. II(8) (2011), available
at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf. For a discussion of Senate and House
Counsel, see Frost, supra note 81, at 942–45.
104. See, e.g., Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (“New Jersey Legislature had
authority under state law to represent the State’s interests in both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals . . . .”); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064–74 (9th Cir. 2012)
(California law authorizes supporters of a proposition to defend it on appeal, speaking for the
state when the state’s elected leaders refuse to do so); Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt,
181 F.3d 1333, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (state legislative council not authorized to sue on
behalf of the state; inference that it would be acceptable party if so authorized); Planned
Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“legislators may obtain standing to defend the constitutionality of a legislative enactment
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has Article III standing in the kind of case we’re discussing, federal law
authorization of Congress to appear on behalf of the United States should
work as well.
What if Congress, or either house, were to appear on its own behalf,
rather than on behalf of the United States? As I’ve argued, standing should
be available here, and then the question is whether such appearances have
been authorized by law. The provisions that establish the Senate Counsel
also authorize intervention, when approved by Senate Resolution.105 Those
provisions do not speak to Senate Counsel’s power to sue, so perhaps they
would have to be amended to so provide. Or perhaps not. Nothing in
federal law precludes the Senate or its Counsel from appearing on behalf of
Congress, or the Senate, as plaintiff. Thus, perhaps a concurrent resolution
of Congress (majority vote in both houses, without presentment), or simply
a Senate resolution, would suffice to authorize Senate Counsel to sue on
behalf of Congress or the Senate. The relevant House Rule authorizes
House Counsel to represent the House under direction of the Speaker, “who
shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group.”106 This Rule
arguably is sufficient for House Counsel to appear on behalf of the House in
the kind of case I’m discussing, as either plaintiff or defendant-intervenor,
if authorized by the Speaker.107 As mentioned above, there’s no reason
Congress couldn’t formalize this by concurrent resolution, either as a
standing matter or in one-off votes. Or the House could do so by its own
resolution.

when authorized by state law”; no such authorization in the case at bar). The Court has
expressly left open the question whether the Take Care Clause or the Appointments Clause
might render unconstitutional statutes authorizing private parties to sue to recover funds on
behalf of the United States (“qui tam” suits). See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
ex rel. Jonathan Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (otherwise holding that “qui tam” plaintiffs
have Article III standing and that states are not persons under the relevant statute and thus
not subject to liability).
105. See 2 U.S.C. § 288b(c). In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), both houses
specifically authorized intervention to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the INS
was refusing to defend it. See id. The Court said, “We have long held that Congress is the
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a
defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is
inapplicable or unconstitutional.” Id. at 940.
106. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 103, at R. II(8).
107. It has worked for House intervention as a defendant in the DOMA section 3 cases
that President Obama has refused to defend. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct.
18, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S. July 15, 2012), petition
for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012). The magistrate judge
approved House intervention in Windsor by applying F.R.C.P. Rule 24(a)(2). See 797 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). I take no position on whether application of that rule, or
any federal intervention rule, is necessary in cases such as this (as opposed to following the
trail from 2 U.S.C. § 130f through House Rule II(8) and the Speaker’s direction of the House
Counsel).
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CONCLUSION
So, we have a way out of the interpretive schizophrenia that occurs when
a President deems a statute unconstitutional, decides he cannot defend it in
court, but enforces the law nonetheless so that he can injure someone and
thus create a classically justiciable federal court case. Presidents should, at
least sometimes, not enforce statutes they deem unconstitutional; that’s part
of seeing the authority for interpreting the Constitution as residing in
multiple repositories of power, in all government officials, not just courts.
This same notion of blended powers should allow us to see Congress as an
appropriate plaintiff in federal court to challenge presidential constitutional
nonenforcement. Congress, or either house, is injured when the President
treats a properly enacted law as if it were a nullity; or we can see Congress,
or either house, as suing on behalf of an injured United States.

